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Russia changes the law on domestic violence – why should it concern the 
UK? 
 
Last week, President Putin signed a new law that introduced changes to existing 
legislation on family violence in Russia. The new law has drawn wide 
international criticism from women, human rights and domestic violence 
survivors’ support groups. The UK and the international community also 
condemned the new legislation, but the response seems to have been more 
muted. A reliance on secondary sources makes the ability to engage with the 
debate limited; this does not mean that its wider implications and whether a 
more robust international response is warranted, cannot be considered.  
 
The change in law has been reported in the media as a ‘decriminalisation’, 
‘partial decriminalisation’ or simply ‘softening’ of certain forms of behaviour. It is 
claimed that it was approved to redress an imbalance in existing Russian 
legislation in which parents would risk a higher sanctions for physically 
disciplining their children than strangers would. A person now apparently risks 
two years imprisonment only if their behaviour towards a family member is 
repetitive (i.e., occurs more than once in a year) and leaves bruises or lacerations 
on the victim of certain a level of seriousness. The process for addressing 
behaviour that does not meet these criteria is now an administrative, rather than 
a criminal one (Moscow Times, 2017).  
 
The debate on how far the state should intervene on family life is not a new one. 
An example is the heated discussion of whether smacking a child should be 
banned in the UK (see section 58 of Children Act 2004). However, in the wake of 
recent progress raising awareness regarding domestic abuse, it comes as a shock 
for the international community that a country would be taking retrograde steps 
in this area.  
 
Part of the problem might stem from a lack of understanding of what is domestic 
violence. By focusing on one or more physical incidents, Russian law is 
apparently ignoring its repetitive and controlling nature, which will often 
consists of a range of behaviour, including verbal abuse or controlling one’s 
finances or communications. It is for this reason that the UK has opted instead to 
use the term ‘domestic abuse’ instead of domestic violence in its policies to 
tackle this form of behaviour. The focus on one incident of physical violence, as 
the Russian law seems to operate, is wholly inadequate to address the hidden 
nature of domestic abuse, and the difficulties victims have coming forward and 
being taken seriously by those who can provide them with protection.  
 
Moreover, the use of an administrative procedure to deal with domestic violence 
should, by nature, add expedience to the process; however, by not using the 
criminal procedure, the Duma is making a judgement about its seriousness. 
Administrative sanctions are commonly used for behaviour for which 
imprisonment is deemed excessive and possibly counter-productive. This is why 
motoring offences are dealt with administratively in many countries, but murder 
or sexual offences are not. The symbolic power of criminal law should not be 
underestimated and indeed was part of the debate leading up to the creating of a 
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crime of controlling and coercive behaviour in the UK. The argument that this 
change would lead to speedier punishment does not sit well with those who have 
been raising awareness for the severity of domestic abuse and the devastating 
impact on its victims and society more widely. 
 
This is partly why it is important for the international community to take on a 
more robust stance towards the new Russian legislation. First and foremost, 
there is a humanitarian argument. There are minimum standards set by 
international conventions regarding the protection of rights considered basic 
and intrinsic to every human being. The European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) requires that states 
provide their citizens with adequate protection for the right to life (article 2) and 
family life (article 8), freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment 
(article 3), and the prohibition of discrimination (article 14).  
 
The formal configuration of domestic violence as a violation of human rights is a 
relatively recent development, dating back to 2009, when the European Court of 
Human Rights convicted Turkey for not providing adequate protection for 
women in situations of domestic violence in Opuz v Turquey. More recently, in 
2014, the Istanbul Convention (formally, the Council of Europe Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence) 
reinforced the notion that domestic violence is primarily gendered and that 
violence against women and girls requires specific, coordinated attention from 
states, NGOs and law enforcement agencies to be effectively dealt with.  
 
Of course, Russia is neither a member of the EU or ratified either of these 
treaties. It therefore cannot be sanctioned for potentially lessening the 
protection of women and endangering their fundamental rights, even though it 
was part of the preparatory negotiations of the Istanbul convention 
(http://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention/cahvio).  
 
However, the UK is a signatory to both the ECHR and the Istanbul convention. In 
its most recent policy on gendered violence (Ending Violence Against Women 
and Girls Strategy 2016-2020), the UK sets itself as an international leader on 
protecting women from gendered forms of violence. Surely a law that 
dramatically softens the punishment for domestic abuse and seems to ignore the 
problematic nature of such behaviour by focusing on physical acts of violence is 
not in accordance with the principles that UK-led policy in this area espouses. 
Regardless of the current political climate and whether the UK leaves the EU and 
the ECHR, one would hope that it would not renegade on the work that have kept 
it at the forefront of the plight to enhance women’s rights and protections 
domestically and internationally.  
 
If a humanitarian point of view were not sufficient to persuade the UK, and the 
international community more widely, to pressure Russia to provide adequate 
support for victims of domestic violence, a rather more selfish and pressing issue 
should add weight to a more assertive stance on this issue. Migrant women tend 
to bring with them the knowledge and experience of the law and legal system 
from their home countries as a frame of reference for how they act in the country 
 3 
of destination. Women who do not see a role for the state in providing protection 
in situations of domestic violence, or who see the support provided by the state 
as tokenistic or useless are less likely to seek help in the country of destination. 
The inability to seek help has, therefore, clear potential detrimental 
consequences for women’s physical and mental health and that of their children. 
This is a situation with inherent social and economic costs that will not be 
effectively addressed without considerable effort from support services to 
engage with these communities. The social and financial implications of a less 
protective law in the country of origin on services in the UK should, therefore, 
not be taken lightly. If the lack of a minimum international level of protection for 
women in abusive situations does not speak to those in power on a humanitarian 
basis, then it should, at least, do so from a pragmatic point of view. 
 
 
